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THE LITIGATION OF THE AMERICA'S CUP RUNNETH
OVER WITH INCONSISTENCIES: A NEW
APPROACH TO INTERPRETING
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
[T]he basic convention for any game is the assumption of a
level field, that all begin as equals, above board. Without that
convention, there is no contest. The highly moralized ...
world of any sport is very fragile in the face of the amoral quest
... to win at any cost, even at the cost of destroying the game.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1990, the New York Court of Appeals2 held in Mer-
cury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club 3 that the America's
Cup trophy rightfully belonged to the San Diego Yacht Club ("SDYC"
or "San Diego"). The America's Cup is a silver trophy for which yacht
clubs from around the world compete to win in regularly held sailing
matches. Traditionally, the yacht club that wins the America's Cup (the
"Cup") defends it in the next competition and accepts challenges from
other yacht clubs to race for the Cup.
In 1987, a controversy arose after New Zealand's Mercury Bay
Boating Club ("MBBC," "Mercury Bay" or "New Zealand") issued an
unorthodox challenge to the SDYC, the Cup's defender.4 The MBBC
proposed to race in a ninety-foot monohull yacht, a size that had not
been raced in the America's Cup competition for fifty years.' The
SDYC, on the other hand, planned to adhere to the current practices of
using smaller boats and of conducting the competition after the usual
three to four year interval between races. Accordingly, the SDYC re-
fused the challenge.6 Mercury Bay sued to force San Diego to accept its
challenge.7 After the trial court held in favor of the MBBC, the SDYC
1. Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d 87, 100 (N.Y.
1990) [hereinafter "Mercury Bay III"] (quoting A. BARTLETT GIAMATFI, TAKE TIME FOR
PARADISE: AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES 62-63 (1989)).
2. The New York Court of Appeals is New York's highest court. THE BLUEBOOK A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 195-96 (15th ed. 1991).
3. 557 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 1990).
4. Id. at 90.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 91. America's Cup controversies are decided in New York courts of law because
a trust instrument created the America's Cup competition and accordingly, New York trust
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decided to defend the Cup in a catamaran.8
The New York Court of Appeals held that questions of "fairness"
and "sportsmanship" in the yachting context were unsuitable for judicial
resolution.9 It also held that the use of extrinsic evidence was inappro-
priate in resolving the controversy at hand. ° Nevertheless, the court in
effect resolved these questions by failing to condemn the SDYC's deci-
sion to race a relatively small and quick catamaran against a large and
slow monohull." Consequently, the court implicitly condoned San Di-
ego's behavior as "fair" and "sportsmanlike." Further, the court consid-
ered extrinsic evidence in its decision, although stating that it would
not.I2 The inconsistencies, therefore, lie in the court's use of the concepts
of "fairness" and "sportsmanship" and extrinsic evidence in the decision
while purporting to base its decision "only on the legal issues
presented." 3
This note examines the background of the America's Cup contro-
versy and analyzes the New York Court of Appeals' decision in light of
current trust principles. Further, this note suggests that the court should
have explicitly considered all relevant extrinsic evidence, instead of selec-
tively doing so in answering the implicitly resolved questions of "fair-
ness" and "sportsmanship." In particular, this note recommends that
courts, given the task of interpreting trusts, should follow current Cali-
fornia contract law. In California, the parol evidence rule, normally a
rule of exclusion, does not bar the admission of extrinsic evidence in in-
terpreting contractual language.
14
law governs disputes that arise out of the races. See Alex M. Johnson & Ross D. Taylor,
Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts &
Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres & America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545, 548 n.8
(1989).
8. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 559. A catamaran is a twin-hulled boat. A hull
is "the hollow, lowermost portion of a vessel, floating partially immersed in the water and
supporting the remainder of the vessel." WEBSTER's ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 691 (1989). A catamaran's two hulls provide the requisite
stability without the massive weight that a monohull requires to ensure stability. The SDYC's
Stars and Stripes weighed in at 6,000 pounds; the MBBC's New Zealand weighed in at 75,000
pounds. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 104 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
9. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 92.
10. Id. at 94-95.
11. A monohull is a boat that has only one hull. Since it has only one hull, a monohull
requires a great deal of weight to maintain stability. See supra note 8.
12. The court stated that it would not employ extrinsic evidence to reach its decision, see
Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 92, yet did so on several occasions. See infra notes 93-101 and
accompanying text.
13. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 93.
14. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968) (The California Supreme Court and Justice Traynor altered California contract
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II. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY
The history of the America's Cup, leading up to and including this
litigation, began in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1857, the owners of
the yacht America donated a silver cup trophy, won in a race around the
Isle of Wight,"5 to the New York Yacht Club ("NYYC") through a
Deed of Gift. 16 With this gift, they established a charitable trust. 17 Over
the years, the trust has been formally amended and interpreted by both
the original donors and the New York courts to resolve various problems
that have arisen in the administration of the trust.'
8
Under the Third Deed of Gift of 1887," any yacht club that suc-
cessfully defeats the defending club becomes the new defender and
trustee of the Cup.2° If, however, the defender of the Cup prevails
against its challengers, it remains the defender and trustee of the Cup.2'
As defender and sole trustee, the victorious club must administer the
trust.22 The Deed of Gift outlines the constraints on the participants and
the competition itself.23 For example, it specifies permissible lengths for
competing vessels and the conditions under which challenges may
issue.24
law by rejecting the notion that the meaning of any writing appearing unambiguous on its face
must be determined without resort to extrinsic evidence).
15. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 547. The Isle of Wight is in the English Chan-
nel off the coast of Great Britain. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Atlas of the World 4 (1989).
16. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 89.
17. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
18. The Cup was returned to George L. Schuyler, the sole surviving donor, after questions
arose concerning the trust's terms. Schuyler resolved those questions by twice amending the
Deed of Gift. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 549-51. Additionally, the New York
courts, at the request of the NYYC, then-trustee of the Cup, twice modified the Deed of Gift in
1956 and 1985. Id at 553-54. In 1956, the court modified the Deed to reduce the minimum
load water-line length of a competing vessel from sixty-five feet to forty-four feet. Id. at 553.
This modification was intended to increase interest in the competition by making it more af-
fordable to build a boat, and it succeeded in doing so. Id at 554. In 1985, the court modified
the Deed to allow a race to be held in the southern hemisphere. Id at 554 n.68.
19. The Third Deed of Gift of 1887 followed the First Deed of Gift of 1857 and the Second
Deed of Gift of 1881. See Johnson & Taylor, supra, note 7, at 553-54. The original trust
instrument was twice-amended to resolve problems that had arisen in the trust's administra-
tion. Id All references to the "deed" are to the Third Deed of Gift, unless otherwise specified.
20. See infra Appendix C.
21. Id.
22. One of the duties of the trustee of the America's Cup is to manage the race, ie., make
preparations for the next race. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 101.
23. See infra Appendix C.
24. The Third Deed states that a challenger is entitled to a match against any "yacht or
vessel," "propelled by sails only," which, if single-masted, must measure between forty-four
and ninety feet on the load water-line. See infra Appendix C. The challenger must provide at
1992]
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In 1987, the SDYC, racing the Stars and Stripes '87, defeated the
Australian defender, the Kookaburra III, to become only the third
trustee of the Cup.25 Shortly afterward, the MBBC challenged the new
defender and current trustee, the SDYC, to a race. Under this challenge,
this race was to be held within a few months26 using a boat of a size that
had not been raced in the America's Cup competition in fifty years.27
San Diego ignored the challenge.2"
Mercury Bay filed suit in the supreme court29 of New York, the laws
of which control the trust instrument that created the America's Cup
competition. ° The MBBC requested that the court declare its challenge
valid and enjoin the SDYC from considering other challenges until the
SDYC responded to Mercury Bay's challenge.3
The SDYC initiated its own lawsuit asking the court to interpret or
amend the third and final Deed of Gift to: 1) preclude challenges such as
Mercury Bay's; or 2) require all future competitions, including the one at
issue, to conform to the current practice of racing boats smaller than
ninety feet-the size proposed by the MBBC-in a multinational chal-
lenger regatta series.32
least ten months' notice to the defender club. Id Races must be conducted between May 1
and November 1. Id All other details are left for the competitors to resolve. Id.
25. Since its inception, the NYYC had been the sole defender and trustee of the America's
Cup until 1983, when the Royal Perth Yacht Club of Australia defeated the NYYC. See
Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 554.
26. The San Diego Yacht Club had delayed announcing the date of the next race. Believ-
ing the SDYC to be unfairly stalling, Mercury Bay requested an immediate competition. See
Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 555.
27. For the last half century, the America's Cup competition was raced with the smaller
forty-four-foot, or twelve-meter, monohulls. This smaller boat is cheaper to build than the
larger monohulls that had been raced in previous America's Cup competitions and thus al-
lowed more countries to participate in the race. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 553.
28. In its challenge, the MBBC requested a deviation from the recent practice of holding
the race every three to four years in smaller monohulls. Accordingly, the SDYC refused to
answer the MBBC challenge. See supra note 7, at 556.
29. In New York, the court nomenclature is different than in most other states: the trial
court is known as the supreme court; the appellate court is named the supreme court, appellate
division; and the highest state court is called the court of appeals. THE BLUEBOOK A UNI-
FORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 195-96 (15th ed. 1991).
30. "Because the Deed of Gift established a charitable trust in New York, the New York
courts have jurisdiction over all disputes involving the America's Cup. See N.Y. EsT. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(c) (McKinney Supp. 1989)." See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at
548 n.8.
31. The Deed of Gift provides that, when a challenge from a Club fulfilling all the condi-
tions required by the deed is received, no other challenge may be considered until the pending
event is decided. See infra Appendix C.
32. Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 545 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696
(A.D. 1 Dept. 1989) [hereinafter "Mercury Bay II"]. This race format permitted "multiple
TRUST INTERPRETATION
A. The Supreme Court's Decision: Accept, Forfeit or Negotiate
The court consolidated the two cases and ruled in favor of the
MBBC, thereby validating its challenge and denying the SDYC's request
for cypres relief.33 The doctrine of cypres developed to allow alterations
to "charitable trusts whose purpose had become obsolete as a result of
changed conditions not taken into account by the original settlor or do-
nor."34 San Diego had argued that the relatively recent upsurge in popu-
larity of the America's Cup competition and the corresponding increase
in the number of participants had rendered the America's Cup trust ex-
tremely difficult to administer. Accordingly, the SDYC felt that the
court should amend the Deed to facilitate the future administration of
both the trust and the race.35
In their trial briefs, the MBBC argued for literal compliance with
the terms of the Third Deed of Gift, while the SDYC asked the court not
to adhere to the literal conditions of the deed but to amend the deed as
requested.36 The supreme court agreed with Mercury Bay and held that
the MBBC's challenge was valid under the terms of the trust. Further,
it held that San Diego's request for amendment of the deed was improper
and unnecessary. 38 Therefore, the court held that Mercury Bay's chal-
lenge must be considered and that the SDYC had three options: it could
accept the challenge, forfeit the Cup or negotiate terms with the
MBBC.39
After attempts to negotiate agreeable terms failed, the two parties
prepared for the competition.4 In January 1988, the SDYC announced
that it planned to defend the Cup in a catamaran, a multihull. A mul-
tihulled vessel had never been raced in America's Cup history, although
its dimensions coincided with those explicitly permitted under the Deed
of Gift.4" The MBBC sought to have the San Diego club held in con-
challengers" [racing twelve-meter yachts] to hold a "sail-off... to determine who may sail for
the Cup." See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 556 n.86.
33. Mercury Bay II, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
34. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 561.
35. Mercury Bay II, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
36. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 556 nn. 84-7 and accompanying text (citing
Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, No. 21,299/87, at 2 [hereinafter
"Mercury Bay I"]).
37. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 91.
38. The court felt that modifying the Deed according to the SDYC's requests would un-
fairly allow the Cup's defender to mandate the conditions for future competitions. See John-
son & Taylor supra note 7, at 558 n.100 (citing Mercury Bay I, No. 21,299/87, at 19).
39. Mercury Bay I, No. 21,299/87, at 19.
40. Id.
41. Id.
1992]
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tempt of the supreme court's order, claiming that San Diego's intention
to race a catamaran against their large monohull would deny it the
"match" to which they were entitled under the terms of the Deed of
Gift.42 The supreme court found that nothing in the deed explicitly for-
bids a catamaran from participating in the race, directed the parties to
reserve their protests until after the races were run and consequently de-
nied Mercury Bay's request.43
In September 1988, the MBBC and the SDYC raced for the
America's Cup trophy." San Diego's catamaran successfully defended
its title against Mercury Bay's monohull, winning two races to zero.4
Because it felt that the competition was inherently unfair, the MBBC
asked the court to set aside the results of the races and declare it the
winner.46 The SDYC cross-motioned, this time asking the court to af-
firm its victory.47 The supreme court again decided in favor of Mercury
Bay, stating that San Diego's actions violated the spirit and intent of the
Deed of Gift, which implicitly required the vessels to be somewhat
evenly matched.4" San Diego was ordered to transfer the Cup to Mer-
cury Bay.49 The SDYC appealed. 0
B. The Holding of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division: No
Similarity Required
The issue on appeal was whether the terms of the Deed of Gift re-
quired the vessels of the defender and challenger to be somewhat evenly
matched. The supreme court held that, because of the settlors'5" explicit
use of the words "friendly competition,"52 the settlors had implicitly in-
42. The Third Deed of Gift states, "Any organized Yacht Club... shall always be entitled
to the right of sailing a match for this Cup, with a yacht or vessel .... " See infra Appendix C
(emphasis added).
43. Mercury Bay 111, 557 N.E.2d at 91.
44. Literal compliance with the Deed and Mercury Bay's challenge prevented all other
yacht clubs from participating in the challenge. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 559.
45. The margin of victory in the first race was over 18 minutes. See Johnson & Taylor,
supra note 7, at 559 n.104. In fact, some suggest that Dennis Conner, the skipper of the
SDYC's boat, reduced that time so that the race would not seem to be such a gross mismatch.
Mercury Bay I1, 557 N.E.2d at 97 n.3.
46. Mercury Bay 11, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
47. Id.
48. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 7, at 559 n. 111 (citing Mercury Bay I, No. 21,299/87
at 13).
49. Mercury Bay 11, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
50. Id.
51. The definition of settlor is: "The grantor or the donor in a deed of settlement. And
also one who creates trusts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (6th ed. 1990).
52. "This Cup is donated upon the condition that it shall be preserved as a perpetual
TRUST INTERPRETATION
tended that the boats be "somewhat evenly matched."53 The appellate
court, however, concluded that the boats were not required to be similar,
thus disagreeing with the lower court's holding.54
The appellate court found that, "[i]n interpreting a trust, courts
must look to the intent of the settlor as expressed in the trust instrument.
A court cannot look beyond the trust instrument where the donor's in-
tent is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms."" Taking issue with
the lower court's conclusion, the appellate court criticized the supreme
court's creation of a condition that was neither express nor implied in the
trust document.56 Because a condition limiting the defender of the Cup
to a particular vessel was not explicitly provided in the trust document,
the appellate court concluded that it could not read such a condition into
the trust."
The appellate court also disagreed with the supreme court's state-
ment regarding the deed's requirement that the challenger give ten
months' notice of the dimensions of its boat to the Cup's defender. The
court found that this requirement did not suggest that the defender had
to enter a boat that was similar to the challenger's entry.58 The appellate
court reasoned, "We cannot find such an intent, especially since the au-
thor of the deed could have stated the rule in a few words, had he so
desired."59 Finally, the appellate court noted that the supreme court ini-
tially did not mandate similarity between vessels, yet changed its tack, so
to speak, after the races had ended and subsequently required
similarity.' °
The appellate court then tried to show that a catamaran was a per-
missible vessel in which to defend the America's Cup by using extrinsic
evidence to show that catamarans existed and raced head to head against
monohulls without handicaps. 6' The appellate court explained that the
donors broadly defined the range of vessels that could race as "any one
Challenge Cup for friendly competition between foreign countries." See infra Appendix C (em-
phasis added).
53. Mercury Bay II, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
54. Id at 702.
55. Id. at 698 (citations omitted).
56. Id
57. Id
58. Mercury Bay I, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. A racing handicap is: "1. a race or other contest in which certain disadvantages
or advantages of weight, distance, time, etc., are placed upon competitors to equalize their
chances of winning." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE 642 (1989).
1992]
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yacht or vessel."'62
Based on extrinsic evidence, the appellate court defined the word
"match" to mean one party contending against another.63 This interpre-
tation contradicted the supreme court's position that the word "match"
required the vessels to be similar." According to the appellate court,
George Schuyler, the sole surviving donor of the Cup, wrote in 1871,
"[t]he word 'match'... mean[s] that but one vessel could start against a
party challenging... ,"65 instead of racing a fleet of vessels against one
boat.66 Thus, according to the court, the settlors intended this phrase to
restrict the competitors to one vessel, not to similar vessels.67
To further demonstrate that the donors never intended the supreme
court's interpretation, the appellate court pointed to Schuyler's rejection
in 1887 of claims that requiring the challenger to give ten months' notice
of the four principal dimensions of its boat was unfair.68 Schuyler stated
that the challenger was required to inform the defender in advance of
these dimensions in order to give the defender an opportunity to meet the
challenger in a yacht of the same type, if the defender so desired.69
Hence, the appellate court concluded that "even if there were a general
requirement of similarity fairly inferable from the deed, the statements of
the donor himself negate any notion that the giving of the four dimen-
sions would enable, much less require, the defender to produce a 'some-
what evenly matched' boat."'7
Finally, the appellate court noted that situations similar to the
SDYC-MBBC dispute had arisen in 1907 and in 1913.71 In the earlier
controversies, a challenger had attempted to force the defender to sail a
vessel identical to its own.72 In response, the trust holders unanimously
adopted a resolution stating that they could not accept any challenge that
would attempt to restrict their choice of design beyond those set forth in
the deed.73 The trust holders explained their rejection of these chal-
lenges, reasoning that to accept them would deprive the defending club
of its choice of the size and power of yacht it wished to race under the
62. Mercury Bay II, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
63. Id. at 700.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Mercury Bay II, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 700-01.
72. Mercury Bay II, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
73. Id.
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terms of the deed.74
In the court's words, the history of the America's Cup is such that,
[fjor 140 years, challengers and defenders alike have ...ex-
pended immeasurable effort to gain any speed advantage ... to
enhance their chances for victory.... Moreover, to compel the
trustee to accept constraints upon the competition that are not
specified in the trust agreement, without the mutual consent of
both challenger and defender, would itself contravene the com-
petitive scheme contemplated by the Deed of Gift."
Based on this use of extrinsic evidence, the appellate court interpreted
the deed to allow a catamaran defense of the America's Cup, and ruled in
favor of San Diego."6
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion: The Use of Extrinsic Evidence Is Forbidden
The issue in the majority opinion of the court of appeals was
"whether the donors of the America's Cup intended to exclude catama-
rans or otherwise restrict the defender's choice of vessel by the vessel
selected by the challenger."77 To determine the intent of the trust set-
tlors who created the America's Cup competition, the court employed
long-settled rules of construction of trusts.7" These included: 1) the pro-
hibition on looking first to extrinsic evidence;79 2) the interpretation of
the trust instrument as written;" and 3) the determination of the settlor's
intention solely from the unambiguous language of the instrument it-
self."1 Only where the court determines that the trust's words are ambig-
uous may it consult extrinsic evidence.8 2
The court deemed the language of the trust unambiguous and
plain, 3 and thus formally excluded the use of extrinsic evidence in con-
struing the trust instrument.8 4 It further found that nowhere in the Deed
of Gift did the donors explicitly prohibit the use of multihulled vessels,
such as catamarans, or seek to limit the defender of the Cup to the same
74. Id.
75. Id. at 703-04.
76. Id at 704.
77. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 93.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 55 N.E. 299 (1899)).
80. Id (citing Central Union Trust Co. v. Trimble, 174 N.E. 72 (1930)).
81. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 93.
82. Id. (citing 2A ScoTr, TRUSTS § 164.1, at 253-54 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1987)).
83. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 93.
84. Id
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or similar type of vessel chosen by the challenger.8 5 In a formalistic
opinion written for the majority, Judge Alexander stated that the phrase
"against any one yacht or vessel" 6 implied that the defender could race
"in a single vessel of any type."8 7
The only restriction on the defender, according to the court of ap-
peals, was the water-line length restrictions applicable to all contestants
for the Cup.88 In response to the dissent's charge that the dimensions
specified in the Deed of Gift related only to monohulls, the court asserted
that the dimensions limited "only the challenging vessel."8 9 Further, the
court found that "the question of whether the dimensions themselves re-
late to multihull vessels is simply not relevant to the issue of whether the
deed precludes a catamaran defense."' The court reasoned that the role
of the specified dimensions was simply to limit the challenger.9 1 Other-
wise, the defender would be greatly disadvantaged, due to the challeng-
ing vessel having more time to design and build its vessel, and the
defender having only ten months.9 2
The court referred to sources extrinsic to the Deed of Gift in its
discussion of the applicability of the specified dimensions to multihull
vessels.9 3 The court stated: "We note that the applicability of the re-
quired dimensions to multihull vessels is hotly contested by the parties
... both of whom have submitted expert evidence. . .. "" Additionally,
the court rejected Mercury Bay's contention that the phrase "friendly
competition between foreign countries" '9 5 required the Cup's defender to
race a boat that was at least substantially similar to the challenger's. In-
stead, the court asserted that this "general phrase does not delineate any
of the specific requirements of the matches to be held." 96 To further
refute Mercury Bay's suggestion, the majority pointed to the deed it-
self.9 7 The language "permits a match between a 44-foot monohull and a
90-foot monohull-two vessels which . . . cannot be said to be 'evenly
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 93.
89. Id. at 94.
90. Id.
91. Id at 93-94.
92. Id. The Third Deed of Gift states that "[the Challenging Club shall give ten months'
notice, in writing ...." See infra Appendix C.
93. Early in its opinion, the court emphasized that it would not consult evidence extrinsic
to the trust document in its interpretation. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
94. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 94.
95. See infra Appendix C.
96. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 94.
97. Id.
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matched' given the much greater speed potential of the larger boat.""8
In yet another instance of the court's use of extrinsic evidence to
prove its point, and for the first time defining what it found to be "fair"
or "sportsmanlike," the court referred to the MBBC's initial challenge to
the SDYC.9 9 The majority stated, "[i]t was Mercury Bay, not San Di-
ego, that departed [from] the agreed-upon conditions of the previous 30
years. San Diego responded to Mercury Bay's competitive strategy by
availing itself of the competitive opportunity afforded by the broad speci-
fications in the deed."'" This reference to a prior historical event clearly
indicates a willingness on the part of the majority to refer to extrinsic
evidence. Immediately after this reference to extrinsic evidence, how-
ever, the court boldly and inconsistently asserted, "[w]e may not look
beyond the four corners of the deed in ascertaining the donors' intent and
therefore may not consider any extrinsic evidence. . . ."' In effect, the
court consulted extrinsic evidence when to do so supported its argu-
ments, but refused to do so when such evidence suggested another resolu-
tion to the controversy.
After claiming to dispose of the MBBC's language-based arguments,
the court focused on Mercury Bay's efforts at showing that San Diego
had breached the charitable trust by the latter's decision to race a cata-
maran.102 The SDYC, as trustee and defender of the America's Cup, had
a duty to the beneficiaries to administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiaries. 0 3 Specifically, "[the trustee] is not permitted to place
himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his
duty to the beneficiaries."" °  Mercury Bay believed that San Diego's
duty as trustee was "to make a fairly considered and unbiased construc-
tion of the Deed of Gift in its selection of a defending yacht."105 Accord-
ingly, the MBBC contended that San Diego's decision to defend in a
catamaran-a clearly faster boat than the large monohull the MBBC
proposed-breached that duty."
According to the concurrence, however, the dissent attempted to
"impose a duty on the defender to-well, to do just what? To not try too
98. Id.
99. Id. Recall that the court stated, earlier in the opinion, that the issues of "fairness" and
"sportsmanship" would not be discussed. Id at 92.
100. Id. at 94.
101. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 94-95.
102. Id. at 95.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
104. 2A SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1987).
105. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 98 n.6 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
106. Id
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hard to win."' 7 The majority found that the competition had started
even before the race officially began.'08 The deed made it clear that the
design and construction of the yachts, as well as the races themselves,
were part of the competition." Further, the defender of the Cup was
not only a trustee but also a beneficiary and thus could be expected to try
to win the race for the Cup. The court of appeals found that "the
America's Cup trust promotes a sporting competition in which the do-
nors clearly intended that the trustee compete on equal terms with the
trust beneficiaries."' 10
In the majority's view, the trustee was required to "act in good faith
and in the spirit of friendly competition by reasonably attempting to
reach an accord on the terms of the matches,""'I and "by racing a vessel
which met the load water-line specifications in the Deed of Gift."'" 2 The
court found that the SDYC met those fiduciary obligations."I3 Finally,
the majority characterized Mercury Bay's contention that San Diego was
required to give them a fair competition as simply an argument "that San
Diego's conduct was 'unsportsmanlike' and 'unfair.' """ These issues, in
the majority's view, were properly resolved by yachting experts, not the
courts. 15
B. The Dissenting Opinion: A Gross Mismatch Is No Match at All
In a lengthy dissenting opinion," 6 Judge Hancock found that the
dispute did not turn on whether the competition was fair: "[T]he over-
whelming consensus of opinion was that it was 'one of the greatest mis-
matches in history.' "'"' Instead, the issue was whether San Diego could
interpret the deed to allow a catamaran defense of the Cup and "fore-
close any possibility of a New Zealand victory, without violating the
terms of its trust and thwarting the donors' very aim in establishing the
trophy: namely, that 'it shall be preserved as a perpetual Challenge Cup
for friendly competition.' ""s
107. Id at 96 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
108. Id at 94.
109. Id.
110. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 95.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 96.
114. Id.
115. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 96.
116. Id. at 97 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 97 n.3 (quoting Poe, A-Cup XXVII, SANTANA, Oct. 1988, App., vol. II, at CA
959, JA 2503).
118. Id. at 97 (quoting the Third Deed of Gift). See infra Appendix C.
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The dissent first acknowledged the gravamen of the majority's opin-
ion: the trust's settlors could not have intended to limit the participants
to race in monohulls "because there is no express language stating [so]
.... " '9 Before attacking the majority's main arguments, however, the
dissent discussed several preliminary issues. First, the dissent pointed
out that the appeal did not concern the propriety of Mercury Bay's initial
challenge to San Diego, even though San Diego persistently tried "to cast
doubt on the propriety of New Zealand's' 20 1 conduct."' 12' The supreme
court had held that the ninety-foot monohull the MBBC proposed to
race "fully conformed with all the requirements of the Deed of Gift."'
122
Second, San Diego argued and the majority held that the entire con-
troversy concerning the fairness of a race between a monohull and a mul-
tihull "should have been referred to an international jury of 'IYRUI'
231-
certified racing Judges.' "124 The dissent, however, did not view the dis-
pute as simply analogous to " 'whether one vessel or another cut inside
or outside a marker.' ",12' Rather, it characterized the controversy as
relevant to "'the fundamental nature of the America's Cup competition
[which] call[ed] for a judicial construction of a trust instrument.' "126
Having refuted two of the majority's preliminary arguments, the dis-
sent addressed the heart of the case-whether the SDYC had breached
its fiduciary obligations to the trust's beneficiaries. Judge Hancock de-
scribed the duties of a trustee: "[T]he defender must act in all respects
with nothing less than irreproachable fairness."' 127 The dissent also de-
clared that these duties are owed "to any yacht club which may file a
challenge against it, . . . to past defenders and trustees of the America's
Cup, those who have engaged in America's Cup competitions and to in-
terested members of the international yacht racing community."' 28 The
dissent discussed the standards governing the conduct of America's Cup
defenders' 29 as " 'not honesty alone, but the punctilio[1301 of an honor the
119. Id at 98.
120. New Zealand is the MBBC's sponsor country. References to New Zealand in this note
are equivalent to references to Mercury Bay.
121. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 99 n.7.
122. Id at 99.
123. "IYRU" is an abbreviation for the International Yacht Racing Union. Mercury Bay
III, 557 N.E.2d at 92. "[A]n international jury referees the match and decides all protests
jointly submitted to it by the parties." Id
124. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 99.
125. Id at 100 (quoting Amici Brief at 25 n. 11, Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d 87 (1990)).
126. Id
127. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 100.
128. Id
129. Those standards apply to trustees generally. Id
130. The definition of the word punctilio is "1. a fine point, particular, or detail, as of
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most sensitive.' ,131
The dissent admitted the difficulty in defining "legal duties involving
standards of ethics and integrity"' 32 and the "defender's responsibilities
as trustee in other than general terms." 13 3 However, it noted several as-
pects of the defender's role as trustee that indicated exactly what was
expected of the defender. First, the trustee's duty arose in the sporting
context, not in the marketplace. 134 Therefore, the rules of the market-
place, such as "'greed, commercialism and zealotry,'" did not apply.
135
Instead, " 'skill or merit... [should] win out.' ,136 Second, the defender
was a competitor as well as a trustee. 1 37 Thus, the defender, as trustee of
the America's Cup, was in the peculiar "position to make a unilateral
rule [of] interpretation affecting his opponents' competitive positions...
to virtually assure victory for himself."'' 3s This conflicted with the de-
fender's role as a trustee. As trustee, the defending club must administer
the trust, or manage the race, in the interest of the beneficiaries.1
3 9
Finally, the dissent noted that the defender, as trustee of the
America's Cup, should be guided by the instructions in the Deed of Gift.
These instructions read: "This Cup is donated upon the condition that it
shall be preserved as a perpetual Challenge Cup for friendly competition
between foreign countries"'" and a challenger "shall always be entitled
to the right of sailing a match for this Cup."' 4 1 Armed with evidence
that San Diego had deliberately tried avoiding any competition in order
to circumvent the MBBC challenge, the dissent concluded that the
conduct, ceremony, or procedure. 2. strictness or exactness in the observance of formalities or
amenities." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1165 (1989).
131. Mercury Bay Il, 557 N.E.2d at 100 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(1928)).
132. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 100.
133. Id.
134. Id
135. Id at 107 (quoting Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 96, Wachtler, J., concurring).
136. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 108 (quoting A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, TAKE TIME
FOR PARADISE: AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES 60 (1989)).
137. Id. at 100. "[Tlhe courts have fixed a very high and very strict standard... whenever
his [the trustee's] personal interest comes or may come into conflict with his duty to the benefi-
ciaries." Id. at 100-01 (quoting 2A SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170.25 at 436 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1989)).
The majority, however, did not impose this high standard on the SDYC. Instead, it found that
San Diego was within its bounds as a competitor to "[avail] itself of the competitive opportu-
nity afforded by the broad specifications in the deed." Id. at 101 n.10 (quoting Mercury Bay
II, 557 N.E.2d at 94).
138. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 101.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Third Deed of Gift). See infra Appendix C.
141. Mercury Bay II, 557 N.E.2d at 102 (quoting Third Deed of Gift) (emphasis added).
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SDYC had violated the condition of "friendly competition" by defending
in a catamaran.
14 2
Citing historical evidence, the dissent argued that the "match" guar-
anteed by the Deed of Gift failed to occur when San Diego raced a cata-
maran against Mercury Bay's ninety-foot monohull. The dissent noted
that George L. Schuyler, the only surviving donor of the America's Cup,
had stated in an 1871 letter regarding a dispute between the Royal
Thames Yacht Club and the NYYC that "'a match' means one party
contending with another party upon equal terms as regards the task or
feat to be accomplished."'4 a During another dispute, Schuyler "under-
scored the dominant theme of his 1871 letter: that the governing princi-
ple of America's Cup competition is fairness, that a race between a
challenger and a defender for the 'Challenge Cup' should be a fair match
on equal terms."'"
The dissent also addressed the majority's claim that the MBBC
should have taken its dispute to the International Yacht Racing Union
because issues of "fairness" and "sportsmanship" were not properly de-
cided in the courts. In response, the dissent pointed to a provision from
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts: "[I]f the trustee in exercising or
failing to exercise a power does so ... to further some interest of [its]
own .... the court will interpose."' Therefore, the relevant question
was whether the decision to defend in a catamaran was to further San
Diego's own interest at the expense of the MBBC, a beneficiary. 46 If it
was, San Diego had breached its fiduciary obligations to Mercury Bay. 147
The dissent opined, "San Diego, in making a rigid and overly literal con-
struction of the Deed of Gift, did so for its own interest and contrary to
the interests of the beneficiaries."'
' 4
1
The dissent then refuted the majority's claims that multihulled ves-
142. Id. For an example of such evidence, see the comment of Dennis Conner, Skipper of
Stars and Stripes that "[t]he catamaran is a tool to deal with the problem-an unwanted prob-
lem." Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 97 n.4 (quoting USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1988, CA 1037,
JA 2826).
143. Mercury Bay 11, 557 N.E.2d at 102 (quoting letter of April 15, 1871) (emphasis
added).
144. Mercury Bay I1, 557 N.E.2d at 103 (emphasis added).
145. d (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON TRUSTS § 187 cmt. g (1959)).
146. Id. "[R]esolution of the decisive issue-whether the Deed of Gift has been properly
construed-depends... on whether San Diego, as trustee, ought to have read it" in a manner
permitting a catamaran defense. Id. at 103-04.
147. For evidence of San Diego's intent, see the comment of Malin Burnham that "[Wle
want to be sure we can put his challenge away with little trouble. We don't want to do any-
thing to risk San Diego losing the 1991 series." Id at 97 n.5 (quoting SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Dec. 7, 1987, App., vol. I, at CA 331, JA 1012).
148. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 107.
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sels were not excluded by the Deed of Gift.149 The majority claimed: 1)
the challenger, not the defender of the Cup, is limited by the dimension
restrictions in the Deed of Gift;13 0 2) the required ten-month notice only
"removes the competitive advantage which would otherwise inure to the
challenger;"'' and 3) the phrase "any yacht or vessel"' 5 2 stands for the
proposition that the defending yacht club is not limited by the type or
kind of boat it raced.'1
3
According to the dissent, however, the length restrictions had no
relevance to multihulled vessels.' 54 Moreover, the ten-month notice
served as a guideline for the defender so that it "can construct a defend-
ing yacht of comparable size and capability."'5 5 The notice provision has
been used for the past one hundred forty years where the competing ves-
sels have been of virtually equal length.'56
To refute the majority's third contention, the dissent employed a
linguistic analysis of the word "any.""' According to the dissent, the
word "any" has a primary and a secondary definition. 5 ' San Diego re-
lied on the secondary definition in concluding that the phrase "any yacht
or vessel" signified that there "should be no limit on the types or kinds of
yachts or vessels chosen to meet a challenger."' 5 9 In the dissent's view, a
more appropriate interpretation of the word "any" suggested that the
donors intended the phrase to limit the defender to only one yacht, as
opposed to defending in more than one.6 ° Accordingly, the majority's
broad interpretation is inaccurate.
The dissent noted that the catamaran traditionally was not consid-
ered appropriate for racing in the America's Cup races. 16' Through the
149. Id at 104.
150. Id at 93-4.
151. Id at 93.
152. See infra Appendix C.
153. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 105.
154. Id at 104.
155. Id "The importance of having closely matched load water-line lengths in racing
monohulls is that the length ... bears a direct relationship to its hull speed." Id. at 102-03
n.ll.
156. Id at 102-03 n.ll.
157. Mercury Bay 11, 557 N.E.2d at 105.
158. Id. The primary definition of "any" is: "1. one (no matter which) of more than two;
as, any boy may go." Id. at n.16 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW 20rH CENTURY DICTIONARY,
SECOND EDmION). The secondary definition of "any" is: "2. some (no matter how much,
how many, or what kind); as, do you have any apples?" Id. at n.17 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY, SECOND EDrION).
159. Mercury Bay I11 557 N.E.2d at 105.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 106.
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broad use of extrinsic evidence, the dissent concluded that San Diego
ignored the legal duty that trust law imposed on it by "adopting a con-
stricted reading of the 'any one yacht or vessel' clause to justify its choice
of a catamaran and assure New Zealand's defeat."'
' 62
IV. THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY OF LANGUAGE REQUIRES
REFERENCE TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF TRUSTS
A. Introduction: Reference to Extrinsic Evidence Is Always Necessary
The discussion above demonstrates that a resolution of the most re-
cent America's Cup controversy entailed examination of extrinsic evi-
dence and concepts such as "fairness" and "sportsmanship." The
question of whether San Diego could construe the Deed of Gift to permit
a catamaran defense of the Cup arose in both the majority and dissenting
opinions. The majority answered that question in the affirmative; the dis-
sent, in the negative. Both, nevertheless, referred to sources extrinsic to
the trust instrument.'63 The difference in the opinions lies in the major-
ity's implicit use of extrinsic evidence coupled with its refusal to so ac-
knowledge, and the dissent's explicit and frequent use of this kind of
evidence.
Instead of claiming not to refer to extrinsic evidence, as the majority
did,' courts should acknowledge that interpretation of trusts, especially
those created long before the time of interpretation, requires extensive
reference to extrinsic evidence. Once courts admit this necessity, the fact
finder can spend the resources to sift through the sometimes conflicting
sources of evidence, and arrive at an equitable and just resolution of the
controversy at hand. In Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego
Yacht Club, if the court had formally admitted extrinsic evidence rather
than implicitly and selectively doing so, it would have arrived at the dis-
sent's conclusion that a catamaran defense was neither contemplated nor
intended by the original donors of the Cup. 6 '
B. The "Plain Meaning" Rule: Language Is Inherently Ambiguous
In effect, the majority in Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Di-
ego Yacht Club relied upon the plain meaning rule of interpretation to
162. Id. at 108.
163. The dissent knowingly and explicitly referred to extrinsic evidence. The majority,
however, implicitly but possibly unknowingly consulted this kind of evidence.
164. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
165. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 104.
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exclude the use of extrinsic evidence in its determination of the donors'
intent.'66 This method of interpretation determines the meaning of a
writing that is clear and unambiguous on its face from the four corners of
the instrument without resorting to extrinsic evidence.'67 The rule
against disturbing a "clear" meaning has drawn many supporters, in-
cluding Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes justified the rule based
on a concern for practicality, stating that not adhering to the plain mean-
ing rule "would open too great risks if evidence were admissible to show
that when they said 'five hundred feet' they agreed that it should mean
one hundred inches, or that 'Bunker Hill Monument' should signify the
'Old South Church.' ,168
In various forms, this rule has been used to interpret written instru-
ments such as contracts, statutes and trusts.169 In the area of contract
law, the parol evidence rule, which embodies the plain meaning rule, pre-
vents courts from considering extrinsic evidence in interpreting con-
tracts.'70 In 1968, however, the California Supreme Court in Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc. '71 ("Pacific
Gas") "turned its back on the notion that a contract can ever have a
plain meaning discernible by a court without resort to extrinsic evi-
dence."' 72 In other words, it held that reference to extrinsic evidence is
necessary in interpreting a contract.
C. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co., Inc.: A Revolutionary Case
A review of the Pacific Gas decision shows why courts should per-
mit extrinsic evidence to show parties' intentions in written instruments,
particularly trusts. The Pacific Gas case involved a contract dispute be-
tween a plaintiff who suffered damage to his property and a defendant,
who was allegedly bound to "indemnify" the plaintiff "against all loss
166. Id. at 93.
167. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 3-9 at 117 (1977). In Mercury Bay III,
the majority stated that "the trust instrument is to be construed as written and the settlor's
intention determined solely from the unambiguous language of the instrument itself." Mercury
Bay Il, 557 N.E.2d at 93 (citing 2A Scort, TRUSTS § 164.1 at 253-54 (Fratcher 4th ed.
1987)).
168. 9 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 2462 at 199 (1981).
169. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.12 at 501 (1982).
170. Id.
171. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc., 442 P.2d
641 (Cal. 1968).
172. Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir.
1988).
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[and all] damage. . . .",17 The trial court rebuffed the defendant's offer
of extrinsic evidence to show that the parties' intentions did not contem-
plate indemnifying the plaintiff for the damages. The court held that the
"plain language" of the contract precluded the defendant's attempt to
avert indemnification. 174 On appeal, however, the California Supreme
Court, in an historical opinion written by Justice Traynor, allowed the
defendant the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence so that the court
could determine the parties' intentions.
175
Under traditional contract principles, extrinsic evidence is inadmis-
sible to interpret, change or add to the terms of an unambiguous inte-
grated written instrument. 176 Justice Traynor, however, believed that
"contractual obligations flow not from the words of the contract, but
from the intention of the parties."' 177 The parties' intentions are divined
from what the parties meant by the words they used in the document.
7
7
Accordingly, "the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument could be justified only if it were feasible
to determine the meaning the parties gave to the words from the instru-
ment alone."'
179
The California Supreme Court concluded that it was impossible to
determine the meaning that the parties gave to the words from the instru-
ment alone. Justice Traynor reasoned that, "[i]f words had absolute and
constant referents, 8° it might be possible to discover contractual inten-
tion in the words themselves, and in the manner in which they were ar-
ranged."'' However, because words do not have absolute referents but
are simply symbols of thought that have no fixed significance,' 82 the
173. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 643.
174. Id
175. Id. at 645-46.
176. Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 568 (citing 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, § 631, at 948-49). Corbin stated that, when a court decides that "the written
words are so plain and clear and unambiguous that they need no interpretation and that evi-
dence is not admissible, it is making an interpretation on the sole basis of the extrinsic evidence
of its own linguistic experience and education." Jeffrey Devashrayee, Note, Trident Center v.
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.: The Continuing Demise of the California Parol Evidence
Rule, 4 UTAH L. REV. 991, 1001 n.65 (1989) (quoting CORBIN, The Interpretation of Words
and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 189 (1965)).
177. Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 568.
178. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644.
179. Id. Note the opinion's reference to a "written instrument," not simply to a contract.
180. The definition of referent is: "1. The object or event to which a term or symbol re-
fers." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1206 (1989).
181. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644.
182. Id. (quoting Pearson v. State Social Welfare Bd., 353 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1960)).
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"meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the verbal
context and surrounding circumstances .. .and experience of their
users."1" 3 The meaning of a writing
can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the cir-
cumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the
words. The exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circum-
stances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to
the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instru-
ment of a meaning that was never intended. 84
Thus, Justice Traynor demonstrates his reluctance to apply the plain
meaning rule to written instruments in general.
According to Justice Traynor, if a court decides, after considering
the proffered extrinsic evidence, that the language of a contract "is fairly
susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended for.. . ,
extrinsic evidence relevant to either meaning is admissible. 1 6 In effect,
the Pacific Gas court held that a party may introduce extrinsic evidence
irrespective of how unambiguous the contract appears on its face.'8 7 The
court reasoned that initially prohibiting extrinsic evidence merely be-
cause the contract writing appears unambiguous frustrates the court's
primary purpose of discovering the parties' intentions in forming the con-
tract.' 8 California's admission of extrinsic evidence to interpret con-
tracts in which two parties deal at arm's length and negotiate a contract
demonstrates the need to allow this kind of evidence in interpreting char-
itable trusts. Extrinsic evidence is particularly useful where parties em-
body their desires in a written instrument and hold a right of property' 89
in charitable trust"9 for the benefit of others.
183. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644 (quoting CORBIN, The Interpretation of Words and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
184. Id at 645 (quoting Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665,
679 (Cal. 1942)).
185. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 645-46 (quoting Balfour v. Fresno C.&I. Co., 41 P. 876, 877
(Cal. 1895)).
186. Pacific Gas 442 P.2d at 646.
187. See Devashrayee, supra note 176, at 998.
188. Id at 1001.
189. The definition of a trust is: "a fiduciary relationship in which one person is the holder
of the title to property subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use the property for the
benefit of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1508 (6th ed. 1990).
190. The definition of a charitable trust is: one "designed for the benefit of a class or the
public generally.... In general, such must be created for charitable, educational, religious or
scientific purposes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1510 (6th ed. 1990).
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D. Application of Pacific Gas Principles to Mercury Bay: The Trust
Instrument Is Inherently Ambiguous
Courts have rejected literal adherence to the "plain meaning" rule in
cases other than Pacific Gas and in areas of law other than contracts.
For example, in the interpretation of congressional enactments, "judges
have come to rely, increasingly, upon such extrinsic aids as committee
reports and records of legislative history." '19 1 Therefore, applying the
concept of allowing extrinsic evidence to interpret written instruments
such as contracts and statutes to the area of charitable trusts is not so
foreign. Indeed, doing so will allow courts to more accurately assess a
settlor's desires in the creation of a trust. Thus, courts will more likely
arrive at a solution in accordance with those intentions.
The America's Cup donors created the competition through a chari-
table trust. 92 They donated the trophy through a deed-a written trust
instrument that embodied the uses and purposes of the gift. 93 Under the
traditional trust principles discussed by the majority in Mercury Bay, a
written trust's "uses and purposes" 9 4 -- i.e., the settlor's intentions-are
determined from the "unambiguous language" 9" of the trust. Finding
that the Deed of Gift was unambiguous, the Mercury Bay majority alleg-
edly excluded the formal admission of extrinsic evidence.
196
As Justice Traynor wrote, however:
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to
the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether
the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.
19 7
The Mercury Bay dissent offered evidence relevant to ambiguous portions
of the Deed of Gift that were susceptible to different meanings.1 9 The
Mercury Bay majority should have used this approach and admitted the
191. Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 2, 4 (1939).
192. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 95 n.4.
193. See infra Appendix C.
194. See infra Appendix C.
195. Mercury Bay 111, 557 N.E.2d at 93.
196. Id
197. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644 (quoting Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 439 P.2d 889,
895 (Cal. 1968)).
198. See supra notes 142-60 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court has
stated further that "the conception of a writing as wholly and intrinsically self-determinative of
the parties' intent to make it a sole memorial of one or seven or twenty-seven subjects of
negotiation is an impossible one." Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564-65 (Cal. 1968) (quot-
ing 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2431 at 103 (1981)).
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extrinsic evidence considered by the dissent to help discern the settlors'
intentions in establishing the America's Cup trust. Generally, these in-
tentions were to preserve the Cup "as a perpetual Challenge Cup for
friendly competition between foreign countries."' 9 9
The dissent reviewed relevant extrinsic evidence to conclude that the
America's Cup donors did not intend for a catamaran to defend the Cup.
The dissent arrived at this conclusion after recognizing that the donors'
aim in establishing the Cup was to maintain the Cup in perpetuity for
friendly competition between challengers." Based on this general goal
expressed by the settlors of the trust, the dissent consulted the past prac-
tices and history surrounding the America's Cup to discover how this
general aim had materialized. In particular, the dissent determined that
the requirements for specification and notification of length had "no im-
portance" to catamarans.2 ' Thus, the dissent found that "catamarans
were never considered in connection with America's Cup races."202
Through these types of references to outside sources, the dissent de-
termined that the SDYC breached its duty as trustee when it defended
the Cup in a catamaran.2 "3 At the very least, the question of a catamaran
defense was not "cut and dried," as asserted by the majority.' 4
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Traynor and the California Supreme Court may not have
realized the possible ramifications of the Pacific Gas decision regarding
the judicial interpretation of written instruments. In Pacific Gas, the
court interpreted a contract-a written document created by two rela-
tively sophisticated parties dealing at arm's length who had contracted
just eight years prior to the court's resolution of the dispute.20 5 In Tri-
dent Center v. Connecticut General Life In& Co., o the court dealt with
two sophisticated parties who were dealing at arm's length a relatively
short time before the dispute arose.20 7
The America's Cup controversy, however, stemmed from a written
document created over a century prior to this dispute. Further, it in-
volved a charitable trust, not a contract. Charitable trusts involve a rela-
199. See infra Appendix C.
200. See infra Appendix C.
201. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 104.
202. Id. at 106.
203. Id. at 107.
204. Id.
205. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 643.
206. Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
207. Id. at 565.
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tionship where one party creates a benefit for a class or the general
public.2 °" Frequently, the settlor of a trust does not provide for many of
the details that a contracting party might include." Thus, a court's
ability to discern a trust drafter's true intentions is even more difficult
than in the context of the contract. In the contractual context, California
courts frequently refer to outside evidence.
Therefore, judicial acknowledgment of the impossibility of finding
an inherent meaning in words,210 whether in contracts, statutes or trust
instruments, would enable courts to more accurately determine a writer's
intentions in drafting a particular legal document. If courts continue to
exclude extrinsic evidence in contexts such as the America's Cup, the
ones "who... believe that [the] America's Cup has become a business,
even one debased by 'greed, commercialism and zealotry,'" may be
correct. 2 "
Perhaps, the reality is that it has come to that. Still, there are
those who believe that [the] America's Cup remains and should
remain a sporting event in the accepted tradition where 'identi-
cal conditions and norms [are imposed] upon play, [and] the
essential assumption of all the rules is that skill or merit ... will
win out.'
2 12
Akram A. Awad*
208. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1510 (6th ed. 1990).
209. This is made evident not only by the fact that the original Deed of Gift was formally
amended twice by the donors and changed several times by the New York courts, but also by
the existence of this controversy in the first place. See supra note 18.
210. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 644.
211. Mercury Bay III, 557 N.E.2d at 107.
212. Id. at 107-08 (quoting A. BARTLETT GIAMATrI, supra note I at 60).
* The author would like to thank the following: first, my family-my father Adib, my
mother Camelia, my older brother Amgad and my younger sister Magda, to all of whom I
dedicate this note; second, all of the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertain-
ment Law Journal, whose assistance in publication was tremendous; and last, professors Bryan
Hull, John Nockleby and Peter Tiersma, whose thoughts and direction led to the ideas behind
this note.
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DEED OF GIFT OF 1857 (FIRST DEED OF GIFr)
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NEW YORK YACHT CLUB:
Sir: The undersigned, members of the New York Yacht Club, and
late owners of the schooner yacht America, beg leave through you to
present to the Club the Cup won by the America, at the Regatta of the
Royal Yacht Squadron at Cowes, England, August 22, 1851.
This cup was offered as a prize to be sailed for by Yachts of all
nations without regard to difference to tonnage, going round the Isle of
Wight, the usual course for the Annual Regatta of the Royal Yacht
Squadron, and was won by the America, beating eight cutters and seven
schooner Yachts which started in the race.
The Cup is offered to the New York Yacht Club, subject to the fol-
lowing conditions:
Any organized Yacht Club of any foreign country shall always be
entitled, through any one or more of its members, to claim the right of
sailing a match for this Cup with any yacht or other vessel of not less
than 30 or more than 300 tons, measured by the Custom House rule of
the country to which the vessel belongs.
The parties desiring to sail for the Cup may make any match with
the Yacht Club in possession of the same that may be determined upon
by mutual consent; but in case of disagreement as to terms, the match
shall be sailed over the usual course for the Annual Regatta of the Yacht
Club in possession of the Cup, and subject to the Rules and Sailing Regu-
lations the challenging party being bound to give six months' notice in
writing, fixing the day on which they wish to start. This notice to em-
brace the length, Custom House measurement, rig, and name of the
vessel.
It is to be distinctly understood that the Cup is to be the property of
the Club, and not of the members thereof, or owners of the vessels win-
ning it in a match; and that the condition of keeping it open to be sailed
for by Yacht Clubs of all foreign countries, upon the terms above laid
213. See Johnson & Murphy, supra note 7, at 587.
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down, shall forever attach to it, thus making it a perpetual Challenge
Cup for friendly competition between foreign countries.
J. C. Stevens
Edwin A. Stevens
Hamilton Wilkes
J. Beekman Finley
George Schuyler
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DEED OF GIFT OF 1881 (SECOND DEED OF GIFT)
The America's Cup is again offered to the New York Yacht Club,
subject to the following conditions:
Any organized Yacht Club of a foreign country, incorporated, pat-
ented or licensed by the Legislature, admiralty or other executive depart-
ment, having for its annual regatta an ocean water course on the sea or
on an arm of the sea (or one which combines both), practicable for ves-
sels of 300 tons, shall always be entitled, through one or more of its mem-
bers, to the right of sailing a match for this Cup, with a yacht or other
vessel propelled by sails only, and constructed in the country to which
the Challenging Club belongs, against any one yacht or vessel as afore-
said, constructed in the country of the club holding the Cup.
The yacht or vessel to be of not less than 30 nor more than 300 tons,
measured by the Custom House rule in use by the country of the chal-
lenging party.
The challenging party shall give six months' notice in writing, nam-
ing the day for the proposed race, which day shall not be less than seven
months from the date of the notice.
The parties intending to sail for the Cup may, by mutual consent,
make any arrangement satisfactory to both as to the date, course, time
allowance, number of trials, rules and sailing regulations, and any and all
other conditions of the match, in which case also the six months' notice
may be waived.
In case the parties cannot mutually agree upon the terms of a match,
then the challenging party shall have the right to contest for the Cup in
one trial, sailed over the usual course of the Annual Regatta of the club
holding the Cup, subject to its rules and sailing regulations, the chal-
lenged party not being required to name its representative until the time
agreed upon for the start.
Accompanying the six months' notice, there must be a Custom-
house certificate of the measurement, and a statement of the dimensions,
rig and name of the vessel.
No vessel which has been defeated in a match for this Cup can be
again selected by any club for its representative until after a contest for it
by some other vessel has intervened, or until after the expiration of two
years from the time such contest has taken place.
214. Id. at 588 (quoting R. COFFIN, THE AMERICA'S CUP at 132-34).
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Vessels intending to compete for this Cup must proceed under sail
on their own bottoms to the port where the contest is to take place.
Should the club holding the Cup be for any cause dissolved, the Cup
shall be handed over to any club of the same nationality it may select
which comes under the foregoing rules.
It is to be distinctly understood that the Cup is to be the property of
the club and not of the owners of the vessel winning it in a match, and
that the condition of keeping it open to be sailed for by organized Yacht
Clubs of all foreign countries, upon the terms above laid down, shall for-
ever attach to it, thus making it perpetually a Challenge Cup for friendly
competition between foreign countries.
George Schuyler
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DEED OF GIF" OF 1887 (THIRD DEED OF GIFr)
This Deed of Gift, made the twenty-fourth day of October, one
thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven, between George L. Schuyler
as sole surviving owner of the Cup won by the yacht America at Cowes,
england [sic], on the twenty-second day of August, one thousand eight
hundred and fifty-one, of the first part, and the New York Yacht Club, of
the second part, as amended by orders of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York dated December 17, 1956, and April 5, 1985. WITNESS-
ETH-
That the said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the
premises and of the performance of the conditions and agreements here-
inafter set forth by the party of the second part, has granted, bargained,
sold, assigned, transferred, and set over, and by these presents does grant,
bargain, sell, assign, transfer, and set over, unto said party of the second
part, its successors and assigns, the Cup won by the schooner yacht
America, at Cowes, England, upon the twenty-second day of August,
1851. To have and to hold the same to the said party of the second part,
its successors and assigns, IN TRUST, NEVERTHELESS, for the fol-
lowing uses and purposes:
This Cup is donated upon the condition that it shall be preserved as
a perpetual Challenge Cup for friendly competition between foreign
countries.
Any organized Yacht Club of a foreign country, incorporated, pat-
ented, or licensed by the legislature, admiralty, or other executive depart-
ment, having for its annual regatta an ocean water course on the sea, or
on an arm of the sea, or one which combines both, shall always be enti-
tled to the right of sailing a match for this Cup, with a yacht or vessel
propelled by sails only and constructed in the country to which the Chal-
lenging Club belongs, against any one yacht or vessel constructed in the
country of the Club holding the Cup.
The competing yachts or vessels, if of one mast, shall be not less
than forty-four feet nor more than ninety feet on the load water-line; if of
more than one mast they shall be not less than eighty feet nor more than
one hundred and fifteen feet on the load water-line.
The Challenging Club shall give ten months' notice, in writing,
naming the days for the proposed races; but no race shall be sailed in the
215. Id. at 589 (quoting Memorandum of Law of the San Diego Yacht Club, Exhibit A,
Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, No. 21,299/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov.
25, 1987)).
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days intervening between November 1st and May 1st if the races are to
be conducted in the Northern Hemisphere; and no race shall be sailed in
the days intervening between May 1st and November 1st if the races are
to be conducted in the Southern Hemisphere. Accompanying the ten
months' notice of challenge there must be sent the name of the owner
and a certificate of the name, rig, and following dimensions of the chal-
lenging vessel, namely, length on load water-line, beam at load water-line
and extreme beam and draught of water which dimensions shall not be
exceeded and a custom house registry of the vessels shall always be al-
lowed to compete in any race for this Cup, and no restriction nor limita-
tion whatever shall be placed upon the use of such centre-board or
sliding keel be considered a part of the vessel for any purposes of
measurement.
The Club challenging for the Cup and the Club holding the same
may, by mutual consent, make any arrangement satisfactory to both as to
the dates, courses, number of trials, rules and sailing regulations, and any
and all other conditions of the match in which case also the ten months'
notice may be waived.
In case the parties cannot mutually agree upon the terms of a match,
then three races shall be sailed, and the winner of two of such races shall
be entitled to the Cup. All such races shall be on ocean courses, free
from headlands, as follows: The first race, twenty nautical miles to wind-
ward and return; the second race an equilateral triangular race of thirty-
nine nautical miles, the first side of which shall be a beat to windward;
the third race (if necessary) twenty nautical miles to windward and re-
turn, and one week day shall intervene between the conclusion of one
race and the starting of the next race. These ocean courses shall be prac-
ticable in all parts for vessels of twenty-two feet draught of water, and
shall be selected by the Club holding the Cup and these races shall be
sailed subject to its rules and sailing regulations so far as the same do not
conflict with the provisions of this deed of gift, but without any time
allowances whatever. The challenged Club shall not be required to name
its representative vessel until at a time agreed upon for the start, but the
vessel when named must compete in all the races, and each of such races
must be completed within seven hours.
Should the Club holding the Cup be for any cause dissolved, the
Cup shall be transferred to some Club of the same nationality, eligible to
challenge under this deed of gift, in trust and subject to its provisions. In
the event of the failure of such transfer within three months after such
dissolution, said Cup shall revert to the preceding Club holding the same,
and under the terms of this deed of gift. It is distinctly understood that
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the Cup is to be the property of the Club subject to the provisions of this
deed and not the property of the owner or owners of any vessel winning a
match.
No vessel which has been defeated in a match for this Cup can be
again selected by any Club as its representative until after a contest for it
by some other vessel has intervened, or until after the expiration of two
years from the time of such defeat. And when a challenge from a Club
fulfilling all the conditions required by this instrument has been received,
no other challenge can be considered until the pending event has been
decided.
AND the said party of the second part hereby accepts the said Cup
subject to the said trust, terms, and conditions, and hereby covenants and
agrees to and with said party of the first part that it will faithfully and
fully see that the foregoing conditions are fully observed and complied
with by any contestant for the said Cup during the holding thereof by it
and that it will assign, transfer, and deliver the said Cup to the foreign
Yacht Club whose representative yacht shall have won the same in ac-
cordance with the foregoing terms and conditions, provided the said for-
eign Club shall, by instrument in writing lawfully executed, enter with
said party of the second part into the like convenants as are herein en-
tered into by it such instrument to contain a like provision for the succes-
sive assignees to enter into the same covenants with their respective
assignors, and to be executed in duplicate, one to be retained by each
Club, and a copy thereof to be forwarded to the said party of the second
part.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said party of the first part has here-
unto set his hand and seal and the said party of the second part has
caused its corporate seal to be affixed to these presents and the same to be
signed by its Commodore and attested by its Secretary, the day and year
first above written.
George Schuyler
New York Yacht Club
by Elbridge T Gerry
John H. Bird
